INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an increasing expectation that institutional investors should become more active in the corporate governance of companies in which they invest. The plethora of renowned corporate governance failures in the last decade has only added to this expectation. The first part of this paper examines the central arguments supporting increased institutional shareholder activism in corporate governance. The paper then explores, in the New Zealand context, the constraints against increased involvement and argues that the proposition for institutional investors as active shareholders is more normative than realistic, given both the legal and economical barriers that actively discourage intervention by institutions in their investments.
II INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1
A The Incidence of Institutional Investors in New Zealand Equity Markets
In New Zealand there has been comparatively little research on the role that institutional investors perform in the corporate governance of companies in which they invest (in this paper referred to as 'investment-companies'). Reasons for this are unclear and may simply reflect the relative paucity of research in general on the incidence and nature of institutional investors as equity holders in New Zealand. The quantitative research that has occurred does confirm that New Zealand is following the trends, observed in the United Kingdom (UK) with one investment objective" 11 , but nevertheless share a number of similarities that distinguish such investors from other shareholders. In a legal sense however there is no distinction between different types of shareholders as the Companies Act 1993 (the Act) simply defines a shareholder as "a person whose name is entitled to be entered in the share register of a company". 12 Even the requirement to disclose substantial shareholding, as set out in the Securities Market Act 1988, applies the term "shareholders" rather than any reference to 'institutional investors'. 13 This lack of acknowledgement in corporate and securities law, as will be discussed below, is a significant legal barrier to institutions taking a more activist stance in relation to their investments.
Farrar's classification of institutional investors does highlight the absence of heterogeneity of such investors as class. For just as ordinary shareholders can be broadly classified as 'punters', 'bondholders' or 'business buyers', institutional investors differ from investor to investor. 14 There has however been a tendency in overseas research, especially research involving empirical analysis of significant associations between institutional ownership and good governance, to treat institutional investors as a homogenous group of shareholders. 15 By assuming homogeneity, academic literature maybe drawing inaccurate assumptions on the incentives and motivation for various institutions to take on active roles in the governance of their investment-companies. Authors like Barnard, 16 Ryan and Schneider, 17 and Monks and Minnow 18 have debated the differences that exist between institutions like public pension funds and mutual funds. For example mutual funds, as active traders, are assumed to be less involved with governance and more concerned with profit-11 Farrar, above n 5, 362. 12 Companies Act 1993, s 96(a). 13 Securities Market Act 1988, subpart 3, requires substantial shareholders (5 percent and above ownership of shares) to disclose and notify, in a prescribed form, their relevant interests and to further disclose and notify, in a prescribed form any changes to their relevant interest in public issuers if these changes affect their relevant interests by more than 1 percent. Collectively, these disincentives to the "exit" strategy by institutions provide an impetus for continuous intervention to ensure performance.
Koh, 32 in a study of associations between institutional ownership of Australian nonfinancial listed companies and earnings quality, finds a negative relationship between concentration of institutional ownership of shares and income increasing accruals that potentially affect the quality of reported earnings. By maintaining their shareholding, institutional investors are able to affect the quality of information being reported to the public in the long-run. Related to this information-performance perspective, is the ability to ensure market participants are continuously informed of the company's actions. Institutional investors have been found to convey managerial information to other shareholders given the institutions' access to superior private information. 33 Being a long-term shareholder with concentrated ownership, the cost of other shareholders free-riding on the institution's monitoring of performance is reduced by the benefits it receives from enhanced performance of the investment-company. 34 Additional support for institutional investors taking a longterm viewpoint is the higher levels of research and development expenses associated with higher institutional ownership.
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Moreover, some authors have argued that institutional investors may be willing to take control of the company or act as "managerial partners".
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The interventionist approach taken by institutions to counter underperformance of companies 30 John Coffee "Liquidity in recent years is another reflection of institutional investors' inability to dispose shares at will given concentrated ownership and passive investment strategies.
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In addition, institutional investors simultaneously provide benefits to other shareholders through effective monitoring of the performance of their investment-companies.
In 
B Governance Improvement
The second claim is that institutional investors should also play an important role in ensuring good governance of their investment-companies. This argument relies on the fact that such institutions through concentrated ownership of shares, together with the financial strength and expertise of the institution are able to effectively overcome the problem of diffused shareholding. 
IV THE CONSTRAINTS
A Legal Barriers
The primary legal issue restraining institutional investor activism arises from the fact that corporate and securities law does not secure additional rights or safe harbours for institutional investors who become involved in corporate governance. Rather they are subject to the same level regulation and disclosure as any other shareholder. In fact, corporate and securities law tends to require more onerous disclosures and duties for larger and/or active shareholders in order to protect other (diffused) shareholders. A fact that may inadvertently result in less protection for such shareholders from the consequences of poor corporate governance practices.
Shadow director and Director's duties
The security holder in a public issuer, the person must give notice to the public issuer and any relevant registered exchanges in a prescribed form containing prescribed information as stipulated under the Act. 77 The same requirement applies if the relevant interest of the substantial security holder in the public issuer changes by 1 percent or more or the nature of the substantial security holder's relevant interest changes due to some event.
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The underlying purpose for these disclosures is due to the market requiring information in order for it to be efficient and such efficiency is not possible when the identities of those controlling or influencing the company are not made public. 79 In general, the Securities Market Amendment Act 2006 did not fundamentally change these disclosure requirements.
On first instance, institutional investors with their small shareholdings across a diverse range of companies do not seem to be within the ambit of the disclosure provisions.
However, issues arise out of the term "relevant interest" which is defined widely in the Act.
For the purposes of this discussion, under the current Act, relevant interest in a voting security exists (whether the person is the holder of the security or not) when a person has the power to exercise or control the exercise of the voting rights to the security which may arise by virtue of any trust, arrangement or understanding relating to the voting rights of the security. 80 Moreover, where the person or its directors are accustomed or under obligation, whether legally enforceable or not, to act in accordance with the directions of another person with relevant interest in the voting rights of the security, the person is also deemed to have relevant interest in the security. 81 The term "relevant interest" is defined widely to not only include direct legal and beneficial ownership of securities but also indirect control of the said securities. 82 The wide definition above ensures interrelated parties within a public issuer provide disclosures to the market to enhance market efficiency.
The problem that institutional investors may face arises out of cooperation to vote as one joint group or in concert in order to affect the governance of their investment-companies.
In having some form of agreement, be it legally enforceable or not, or even some form of under the Act and may result in a fine to a maximum of NZ $30,000.
Investment Fiduciaries
Institutional investors may also be constrained by considerations derived from the legal form of the investor. With regard to managed funds, investors or clients provide cash to a fund manager who "has undertaken to use that consideration to generate financial returns for the benefit of the investor." 83 The cash is used to purchase 'investment assets' that are purchased not in the name of the fund manager, but in the name of another party, either a trustee or a custodian on behalf of the trustee. 84 The effect of such arrangements is that the registered holder of the investment assets, whether it is a custodian or a trustee, holds them on trust for the beneficiaries. Secondly, the registered holder of the investment assets (usually shares) will be normally be required by the investment management contract to vote those shares in accord with the wishes of either the fund manager or the trustee, depending on the specific form of institutional investor. However, a separate issue arises as to whether fund managers or trustees can be required to vote. As has been observed with regard to the Australian investment fiduciaries; unless there is an express contractual obligation, the issue of whether trustees or fund managers have an obligation to vote is regulated by the common law or governing statutory regime.
Many forms of institutional investors use trusts as the underlying business structure.
Trustees of such trusts owe, subject to the general law of trusts, general duties such as the duty of loyalty, duty to act personally and a duty of efficient management. A trustee's duty of care to the trust forms part of the duty of efficient management and requires a trustee to exercise the standard of care of an ordinary prudent businessperson in regard of his or her own business. 85 A trustee has also a duty to act in what the trustee considers to be the best interests of the beneficiaries of the trust. 86 None of these general duties mandate that trustees must vote on all occasions that shareholders in an investment-company may be required to vote. For while voting should always be one of the options that a trustee should consider, the trustees are obliged to do no more than inform themselves in order to make a rational active intervention by institutional investors are heavily dependent on the composition of the institutions' investment portfolio. The next section will discuss the economic issues that tend to discourage institutional investor activism.
B Economic Barriers to Institutional Investor Activism
As outlined above, some commentators have argued that institutions are required to be responsible shareholders to ensure directors act for the benefit of the company as a whole, institutions may perceive their role of shareholder and its entailing duties as merely incidental to its investment strategy. Ali, Stapledon and Gold 89 in 2003 observed that although there had been a numerous suggestions as to how institutional shareholder might become more active shareholders, the fact was that such suggestions have not been observed in practice.
They contend that this "can be explained largely by the economic incentives and disincentives facing institutional investors."
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The most obvious of all economic disincentives costs is the financial cost for institutional investors to intervene in the governance of their investment-companies. Direct costs will include legal and professional advice, employee time charged towards governance issues and consequential loss of opportunity costs arising from using resources on a particular investment-company. For an active institutional investor to commit a number of senior fund managers and upper management of an institution to the monitoring of one investment, must inevitably result in lost businesses elsewhere and a lack of attention to other existing clients. 91 Moreover, if the issue has to be brought before a meeting of the company for vote by the shareholders, active institutional investors would have to bear the cost of circulating lobby documents, proxy solicitation and sacrifice time and effort to argue for their cause at the shareholders' meeting. Given that institutional investors are primarily traders for profit, the cost and time expended on governance matters may not commensurate the benefits received for their effort. Also, given the size of most institutional investor holdings, the institution faces a collective-action problem. Invariably that "in order to be effective, 100 Furthermore, incurring relational costs will also result in reputational costs to the institutional investor if it is made known to other clients that the institution is an active intervener on governance matters. Interviews with the institutions' managers refer to this gain in reputation as a loss of valuable business with current and future clients and may affect the personal career of the institutions' managers. 101 An example of relational and reputational cost occurred in both the Coles Meyer and Bell Resources cases in Australia. In
Coles Meyer, a senior trade-union official intimidated the intervening institution with a withdrawal of its superannuation funds while in the Bell Resources case, the institutional investor was threatened by the offeror-company with negative television publicity if it did not stop complaining about the company. 102 Given the above, institutional investors face issues similar to audit firms before the Enron saga where the prospect of losing other lucrative services may force the institution to take passive steps in the governance of their investmentcompanies.
Lastly, from a theoretical perspective, although institutional investors have been hailed as the solution to the agency problem due to their size, concentrated ownership and financial resources, an alternative perspective has emerged depicting institutional investors as a cause of greater agency problems. A simplistic view is to perceive the relationship between the institutional investor and its investment-companies as that of a shareholder-management relationship. However, complications arise as institutions are not the "actual" shareholders of the investment-companies. Institutions are only financial intermediaries and the real shareholders are the clients of the institutional investor. 103 Moreover, the relationship is made even more complex when one takes into account the gap between the institution's decision makers and its ultimate clients. Within that gap, there are numerous fund managers, brokers, investment consultants, fund trustees and monitoring mechanisms that act to widen the separation between the fund beneficiaries and the institution. 104 With each layer of separation, agency costs for fund contributors increase as more decision-making and control are removed from their influence. Thus, the collectivisation of investment funds contributes more to the agency problem from within the institution itself and between the institution and its investments. 105 Furthermore, agency relationships between the institutional investor and its investment-companies are not merely the typical one-way principal-agent variety. Ryan and Schneider suggest a dual agency relationship where the principal and agent interchange their roles due to the opposing agency contracts entered into between the two parties. 106 An example is that of the insurance company and the insured. The insurance company can be the insurance agent of the insured and concurrently invest funds in the insured's companies.
Although this situation applies directly to all pressure-sensitive institutional investors, pressure-insensitive institutional investors may face these dual-agency contracts in dealing with the government and in supporting the local community. 107 As a result, this complicated relationship may impact the institutional investors' decision to actively intervene in the governance of their investments given that institutions face a complex web of opposing and reciprocal contracts with their stakeholders.
V CONCLUSION
Institutional investors have an important role to play in corporate governance by being active monitors of their investments and providing another safeguard against management's plans which may reduce shareholders' wealth. However, the literature is just beginning to 103 Solomon, above n 20, 112. focus on not only whether institutions should intervene, but also whether institutional investors can intervene. Both of these questions need to be debated in order to realistically consider their role in corporate governance. However, although legal impediments can be reduced through the passing of new legislation, the economic impediments are harder to overcome. Institutions are still primarily traders and hold shares as part of their overall investment strategies. As a result, there is a demand for the benefits derived as a shareholder but not the responsibilities it entails. Traders by nature, institutional investors have other business interests to protect and will not sacrifice these profit-making avenues for the sake of good governance. To encourage institutional investors to increase their participation in corporate governance, there is a need for a stronger business case and more robust research into studies that link governance to performance. Doing so would enable corporate governance to become a competitive advantage and bring benefit to institutional investors that do choose to become active monitors.
